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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the strategies and management
plans that have been employed by a major computer services
company to meet corporate objectives for growth in the
commercial business segment. In so doing, the emphasis is
on strategic management and its execution, not the planning
process in isolation.
The thesis traces the history of the company from its
formation in 1970 to 1988. Emphasis is placed on the
organization and its evolution during these years. The
company structure, style, culture and processes had a
significant effect on product and industry strategies.
Major shifts in corporate strategies and resultant successes
or setbacks are analyzed in this context. It is important
to examine the company relative to the computer services
industry as a whole, therefore industry features, trends,
and future strategies were explored to determine whether
this firm should continue to compete in this environment. It
was concluded that the firm should continue to pursue
opportunities in the computer services industry.
Recommendations for improvement center on management
techniques and incorporating strategic plans into the
operating management of the company.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. N Venkatraman
Title: Assistant Professor of Management
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Boeing Company has an established tradition of
excellence and world presence in the commercial jet aircraft
industry. The company has captured and maintains more than
a 60 percent share of the world commercial jetliner market,
is consistently rated as one of the ten best managed
companies in the world and holds down the top spot as the
single largest exporter ($6.3 billion estimated in 1988)1 in
the United States. Although best known as a manufacturer of
commercial jetliners, Boeing competes in a number of world
markets as a diversified, high technology firm. The company
consists of seven primary business units, commercial
airplanes, aerospace, helicopters, military aircraft,
electronics, advanced systems, and computer services. It is
the computer services company that is the general focus of
this thesis.
1. "Made in the U.S.A.", Business Week, February 29, 1988
Boeing Computer Services
Boeing Computer Services (BCS) was formed in 1970 with
a two-fold objective: first to create a single cost
effective source of computing services to other Boeing
operating companies, and second, to compete in the
commercial and government systems marketplace. The first
objective has been achieved successfully. BCS consistently
wins high marks from the other operating companies and
Boeing corporate offices when rated each year against
established cost and performance criteria. BCS support to
Boeing has also been tested in terms of cost and service
competitiveness with outside sources of computing. Time and
time again it is found that the quality, depth, and breadth
of the service provided by BCS can not be cost effectively
matched by external sources.
However, there is some debate as to whether Boeing has
successfully achieved the second objective, that of
competing effectively in the external market. It is
important therefore, to examine the strategies associated
with the formation of Boeing Computer Services external
business segments, Commercial Services Group (CSG) and
Government Information Services (GIS), and the evolution of
these plans with respect to creating, developing, and
maintaining a competitive, profitable business venture.
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Strategic Planning in the Computer Services Industry
Most companies in the computer services industry have
a difficult time instituting strategic planning due to
rapidly changing technology and the proliferation of low-
cost start-up firms. Markets for these products and
services are extremely hard to define, and 'windows-of-
opportunity' tend to be very small. However, it is
precisely these factors which make a good strategic plan and
management of that plan critical to achieving success in the
computing services industry.
Strategic management is a dynamic process that
integrates mission, strategies, and implementation plans. 2
Linkages between strategy and managing strategy are often
weak. Effective strategic planning should not be done apart
from managing the business but rather should be an integral
part of the day to day operations.
At all levels there must be a clear understanding of
strategic direction and tactics for execution. Is the
company moving in the right direction? Are the strategies
correct? Are they being executed as expected? If not, why?
And what should be done?
2. S. M. Felton, What's New in Strategic Planning: A
perspective for Planners, Presentation for the Northern
Wisconsin Chapter of the Planning Forum, DATALOG file, No.
87-1123, September 18, 1986.
"Chesire Puss," (Alice) began,..."would you please
tell me which way I ought to go from here?" "That
depends on where you want to get to," said the
Cat. "I don't much care where...," said Alice.
"Then it doesn't matter which way you go," said
the Cat.
Lewis Carroll Alice in Wonderland
Thesis Objective
This thesis proposes to examine whether the product and
service strategy developed and executed by Boeing Computer
Services-Commercial Services Group (BCS-CSG) has been
effective in achieving and sustaining CSG's competitiveness
in the commercial marketplace. This question will be
addressed in the following context:
-Description of industry markets.
-Effects of technology on the computer services
industry.
-Description of the strategies employed by CSG.
-Analysis of the strategies and their execution.
-Examination of the results achieved.
-Recommendations for the future.
Thesis Scope
The thesis will focus specifically on Boeing Computer
Services' external business segment, the Commercial Services
Group. I adopt both an internal view (organizational
strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities) and an external
view (market opportunities, industry threats etc.). I look
inward at the company itself with primary emphasis placed on
planning activities which have taken place since 1983.
However, in order to keep recent developments in the proper
perspective, it is essential to review the history of this
planning process since the formation of Boeing Computer
Services in 1970.
An external view will place special attention on the
computer services industry as a whole, with specific
emphasis on the markets and product niches in which Boeing
has selected to compete. The relative strategies and
successes of the Government Information Services group will
be used as a point of comparison to the Commercial Services
Group, where appropriate.
Methodology
The thesis is primarily an empirical study. That is,
it is based on research gathered as a result of observation
and/or practical experience. The information presented in
the body of the thesis was collected in a series of
interviews conducted with key individuals in the Boeing
Company and at Apollo Computer, Inc. Individuals
interviewed at Boeing were selected based on their position
within the company and/or their known expertise and
experience. The interviews conducted at Apollo were done in
order to gain a clearer understanding of the computer
industry in general, as well as to discuss market trends,
past, present and future. Apollo was selected as opposed to
other local high technology firms because of their expertise
in the engineering and scientific product areas.
Boeing strategic planning documents, long range
business plans, and operating plans were collected and used
as reference material. Research data regarding the
computing services industry at large, and information
specifically related to competition within the industry was
reviewed to develop questions for the interviews.
Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized into five principal parts.
The first is this chapter (Chapter 1) which serves as an
introduction, discusses the objective, scope, and
methodology used in the thesis. Chapter 2 provides a
general overview of the computing services industry, with a
section devoted to Boeing Computer Services' position in the
industry. Chapter 3 traces the history of BCS from 1970 to
1988, emphasizing organization, market, and product
strategies. Chapter 4 is an analysis of Boeing Computer
Services' strategic planning process, strategic plans, and
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strategic management. Chapter 5, the final section of this
thesis, presents recommendations and conclusions drawn from
information presented in the preceding sections.
CHAPTER 2
THE COMPUTER SERVICES INDUSTRY
For the top 100 companies in the data processing
business, total revenues were up to $176.9 billion in 1986,
17 percent over the total revenues of 1985. In 1985, the
computer services industry alone was 5.72 percent of the
total data processing market, generating revenues of $8.6
billion. In 1986 computer services market share had grown
to 6.7 percent with $11.9 billion in revenues. Although the
services industry is relatively small when compared to total
hardware sales ($112.3 billion for mainframes, minis, micros
and peripherals), it is never the less a rapidly expanding
segment of this industry which cannot be ignored.3
This chapter will examine the computer services
industry in general with specific focus on Boeing Computer
Services and the relative position it assumes in this
industry. The publication Datamation is used to provide
industry definitions, financial data, and competitive
rankings. Specifically, Boeing Computer Services external
businesses will be described in terms of customer profile,
3. Staff Report,"The Datamation 100", Datamation, 15, June
1987.
markets and products. BCS strategic management will be
reviewed with emphasis on two products, software sales and
office services.
Industry Description
Definition
Datamation defines data services as including: custom
programming, systems integration, consulting, time-sharing,
and remote processing. Other definitions may include
telecommunications and extended professional services such
as education and training. The market for these services
remains quite strong because both public and private
organizations are still wrestling with office and factory
automation and must often rely on outside sources for
advice, training, custom programming, processing time, and
development of integrated or turnkey systems.
BCS
Boeing Computer Services established itself in the
services industry in 1970 serving both the private and
public service sectors. The United States government and
state and local governments have proved to be excellent
markets for facilities management programs, major systems
integration and telecommunications projects. On the
commercial side, the product niche that BCS carved out has
changed significantly over time. Initially time-sharing was
the primary business with various, less significant
17
consulting, training, and programming support activities
generating the balance of the revenue. As technology and
the customers' needs changed, the BCS commercial strategy
was directed toward market opportunities in areas that
Boeing traditionally had expertise, such as systems
integration, super-computing, and value-added labor
services. Figure 1 indicates BCS' relative market position
in the computer services industry by 1985.
MARKET SEGMENT MARKET SHARE(Percent)
Professional Services 1.0
Software 1.5
Support Services & 1.8
Integrated Information
Systems
Commercial Processing* 3.4
* Traditional time-sharing market was rapidly declining.
Fig. 1 BCS Commercial Services Market Position-1985
(Market Value=$25 Billion)
Business Environment Today
In todays' data processing environment the services
industry is lagging behind the hardware industry in terms of
revenue and profits. But today, more than ever, both are
essential to achieve cost effective objectives through the
implementation of automation. Traditional services such as
payroll, accounting, bank processing and credit
authorization continue to be huge profit centers. However,
the need to integrate multiple suppliers hardware systems,
or access super-computing processing from an engineer's
desk-top has opened up new areas of opportunity for the
services industry. This new era in services--systems
integration--has growth potential beyond what anyone could
have imagined prior to 1982.
Systems Integration
Systems integration is the capability to tie various
computer hardware and software systems together into
networks that will increase their value to the user.
Hardware and application software have vastly different life
cycles. In order to maximize the investment in both and
take advantage of technological improvements, systems
integration capability is essential. This includes
providing the networking between old hardware and new, as
well as creating linkages between new hardware and existing
software or databases.
To be a successful integrator, a computer services
company must have the skill and expertise to understand the
hardware and software technology available to their
customers. This is why firms, large and small, are deciding
to "buy versus make" when requiring these services. The
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complexities of the market almost dictate that the services
company be a large, high technology firm with sophisticated
in-house resources. The closer the ties between the
services company and the hardware suppliers, the greater the
benefit to all parties.
Alliances
In the early years of data processing IBM and one or
two other large companies set the pace and the standards for
the entire industry. Their power tended to rest in the
ability to manufacture and sell mainframes. The migration
from mainframes to distributed processing systems has
enabled many new companies to enter the market and exert
significant influence on customer purchasing decisions.
Indeed, it is becoming increasingly clear that one supplier
(hardware or software) can not go it alone. Hence,
strategic alliances are playing an ever expanding role.
The key to success in todays' environment lies in
strategic alliances between and among computing industry
companies. Alliances are entered into for multiple reasons:
to increase product distribution networks, to develop joint
marketing strategies, create total systems solutions for the
customer, and to develop new technologies and eventually
products. No longer is trying to sell just a piece of
software or hardware the main solution. In many cases
20
survival in the industry is dependant solely on the firms
ability to enter into alliances. Companies such as AT&T and
Sun Microsystems, DEC and Apple, IBM and Dassault, Microsoft
and Ashton-Tate, have joined together to leverage their
position in the market(Figure 2). These "teams" have begun
to gain strength by virtue of the alliance and as a result
are becoming industry drivers.
COMPANIES RESULTING YEAR
PRODUCTS FORMED
Apple/DEC
AT&T/Olivetti
AT&T/Sun Microsystems
Data General/Nippon
Telephone & Telegraph
General Motors(EDS)/
McDonnell Douglas
Honeywell/Bull/NEC
IBM/Dassault
IBM/Lotus
IBM/Microsoft
Microsoft/Sybase/
Ashton-Tate
Sperry/Burroughs
(Unisys)
Connectivity
PC' s/Marketing
Workstations/Software/
Chip Technology
Communications Network
CAD/CAM/CAE
PC' s/Distribution
CAD/CAM/Marketing
Software/Marketing
Operating System/
Software/Marketing
Database Server
Minis/Mainframes/
Networks
1988
1983
1985/
1987
1988
1987
1987
1985
1987
1982
1988
1986
Fig. 2 Key Alliances in the Computer Industry
Future
The key to maintaining success for the future rests
with the company or partners' ability to be creative and
innovative. This not only means new products, but new
methods of bringing those products to market, or new
services which will add value to existing products. To
ensure future success each company will have to be
innovative in the strategic planning process and more
importantly in the execution of these plans.
Key Companies
Every year Datamation collects information on more than
200 data processing companies worldwide. The companies are
ranked on the basis of their data processing revenues. The
revenues are defined as coming from the following
categories: computer systems, peripherals, software, data
services, and maintenance and repair.4 Figure 3 ranks the
leading computer services companies for 1985 and 1986.
It is important to note that each year more and more
businesses are entering the services industry. New entrants
signal a more attractive and more competitive environment.
4. Ibid.
1986 1985 %
COMPANY ($ MIL.) ($ MIL.) Change
1. TRW Inc. 1450.0 1275.0 13.7
2. ADP Inc. 1298.1 1102.1 17.8
3. General Motors Corp. (EDS) 1125.9 978.3 15.1
4. Computer Sciences Corp. 977.7 800.7 22.1
5. McDonnell Douglas 803.2 650.0 23.6
6. Control Data Corp. 752.0 1058.7 -29.0
7. Martin Marietta 659.4 564.4 16.8
8. Nippon Telegraph & Telephone 577.6 382.0 51.2
9. General Electric Co. 550.0 950.0 -42.1
10. Arthur Anderson 546.0 414.7 31.7
11. Cap Gemini Sogeti 419.9 245.1 71.3
12. NCR Corp. 350.0 300.0 16.7
13. The Boeing Company 300.0 270.0 11.1
14. IBM 300.0 300.0 NC
15. Nomura Computer Systems Co. 263.5 151.7 73.7
Fig. 3 The Top 15 Computer Services Companies
In reality, Boeing Computer Services is not in direct
competition with all those companies ranked in the top
fifteen (Refer to Figure 3). Primary competitors in the
major government systems programs include, Martin Marietta,
Computer Sciences Corp, EDS, TRW, McDonnell Douglas, and
IBM. Competitors not included in the top fifteen ranking
such as Lockheed, Grumman, Ford, Bendix, and AT&T further
complicate the picture. However, it is important to
understand that a competitor on one government bid contract
may become a partner or team member on the next bid.
In the commercial services area competition is somewhat
different. Boeing is in competition with universities,
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hardware and software companies, as well as other service
organizations. Competitors include CDC, EDS, CSC, and IBM
as shown in Figure 4. Unlike the government systems side of
the business where you team with a company one day and
compete the next, BCS commercial plans to build alliances
with hardware companies as part of a long term strategy.
Relationships of this nature include companies such as
Apollo Computer, Inc., and SCS.
Fig. 4 BCS Commercial Competition-1987
In each case the alliance benefits both parties in that it
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provides BCS with a mechanism for getting their software
products and services into the market, and in turn BCS
products add marketable value to the suppliers hardware.
BCS's Position in the Commercial Market
Customer Profile
One of the greatest resources BCS has to draw on when
developing products and services targeted for the external
market is the systems expertise developed inside Boeing in
support of the other Boeing operating companies. As Boeing
is primarily an engineering and manufacturing company it has
always seemed natural for BCS to concentrate its sales
efforts on companies with similar needs and products. This
spills over quite naturally into the high technology and
scientific computing arena as well. Specifically, those
companies that fit into this profile are centered in the
aerospace, automotive, computer hardware, communications,
and energy industry. Attempted entries into the financial,
banking and medical services businesses although initially
successful, were later abandoned due to lack of synergy with
Boeing expertise.
However, there has always been a dichotomy on the part
of BCS management when making reference to the customer
base. On one hand it has been stated that BCS sees its
potential customers as the Fortune 500, more specifically
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Fortune 100, companies. This customer segment appears to
have been selected based on who could afford the products
and services more than on customer need. On the other hand,
there is little evidence, either in the way the sales
accounts are handled, or in the identification of specific
customers that this in fact is the target market. Rather,
product development and market strategy focuses on general
industry accounts, as opposed to specific customers.
Market Niche
BCS has identified integration services as their major
strength in the market. There is a growing recognition that
"integrated systems" furnish the competitive edge in the
commercial marketplace. This, when combined with something
referred to as "solution selling", that is, not just selling
an individual product but bringing many resources to bear on
a problem, make BCS somewhat unique in the services
industry. Further, the innovative technologies that are
used to solve systems problems within Boeing can be
transferred for use in the external market. The products
and services that BCS offers are not low cost and often
priced higher than the competition. Therefore it is
essential that the customer recognize the value added by
BCS: quality, customer service, commitment, and nearly
unlimited technical resources.
26
Products
BCS product strategy today is focused on what are
referred to as "core" offerings. This includes a
manufacturing integration software tool, PMS; a engineering
design and integration tool, Axxyz; an integrated
manufacturing services organization, CIM; professional
consulting services; and an engineering-scientific services
group providing labor and application software support and
super-computing services.
It is in the marketing and distribution of these core
products that strategic alliances or partnerships with
outside suppliers become increasingly important. Boeing,
like others in the services industry can no long rely on
thinking that the product will sell itself. Long
development cycles for sophisticated software tools such as
those mentioned above must be off-set by strong effective
distribution networks. In addition, alliances with hardware
suppliers can create access to alpha or beta test sites at
which time both hardware and software can be tested in a
production setting. Alliances should be an integral piece
of this overall product strategy.
Effect of Technology on Market Strategies
Evolution of Technology
Rapid growth in the data processing industry during the
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past thirty years is directly related to the seemingly
unending changes in technology. In 1970 more than 90
percent of the of the dollar value of computers sold was
attributed to mainframes, a total of 68 percent of the
computers shipped.5 The balance was minicomputer deliveries
and purchases. This was the era of batch processing and
time-sharing. Large corporations that could afford
mainframe power often times found themselves with excess
capacity and as a result discovered a natural market for
selling it--time-sharing. This was a lucrative and
profitable business throughout the 1970's and gave many,
including BCS, their start in the computing services
industry.
In 1980 microcomputers accounted for only 15 percent of
the market dollar value for computer hardware, but
represented an amazing 83 percent of the units shipped. By
1987 microcomputers accounted for 40 percent of the sales
revenue and 97 percent of the computers shipped.6 Having
gone from no market presence in 1970 to shipments of over 4
million in 1987 demonstrates the profound effect this device
had on the information processing industry.
5. Parker Hodges, "Three Decades by the Numbers",
Datamation, 15, September 1987.
6. Ibid.
With the advent of the microcomputer the end-users
needs changed as well. Dependency on the mainframe had been
reduced, or in many cases eliminated, and workstation
technology had replaced it. Workstation technology could
take many forms, word processors, personal computers or
professional workstations, but by 1982 the major industry
emphasis had shifted from the number-crunching power of
mainframes and minicomputers to what would become known more
generally as office automation. The power of computing
could now be placed at the fingertips of the computing non-
professional. Information management became an industry
buzzword. People needed networks in order to better manage
and access the multiple databases residing at desktop
workstations. Those with workstations or personal computers
wanted to access minicomputers or super-computers. The
industry had grown so rapidly that no standards existed
between or among the various types of hardware, making it
almost impossible to pass information from one make of
machine to another. To further complicate the problem,
literally thousands of software manufacturers sprang up
overnight, with some going out of business just as quickly.
Compatibility did not exist between the various brands of
software. This provided the computer services industry with
an opportunity to enter new markets with products and
services.
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(Examples of) BCS Product Strategies
In the early 1980's BCS management made a decision to
implement a product based strategy, two components of which
were software products and office services. The first,
software, was driven by the perceived opportunity for BCS in
the market based on technology trends rather than on a clear
understanding of BCS's actual in-house capabilities.
Microprocessor software was also an area in which profit
margins were between 15 and 25 percent in an industry where
hardware and support service margins hovered around 8
percent. The opportunity to improve overall profit margins
was certainly attractive to BCS. The second, office
services, was undertaken because there appeared to be an
opportunity in the market and a logical way to weave this
into the overall company strategy. Yet the real decision
behind setting up this group had more to do with providing a
"band-aid" solution to another problem than with marketing
strategy.
Microprocessor Software
In the microcomputer software products market BCS had
the ability to develop excellent products; business
spreadsheets and graphics packages. However, typical of
Boeing, the product development cycle was quite long, in an
industry where the window of opportunity is relatively
short. Internal costs were high, in an industry where many
firms did not even pay minimum wage. Effective channels of
distribution were almost non-existent in an industry where
much of the pre-packaged "shrink-wrapped" software was sold
in retail outlets. Competitors in this market were
companies either devoted exclusively to the creation of
software such as Lotus, or companies that developed software
to run on their own hardware, such as IBM or NEC. BCS was
neither. Boeing had a technically superior product but had
strategically miscalculated their capabilities and the
market.
As part of its strategy to consolidate its commercial
businesses, in November 1987 BCS sold its micro products
group to m+s elektronik of West Germany. Along with the
products themselves went the responsibility for sales
distribution and service. In February 1988, the sale was
rescinded. Conditions of the sale were not made public.
Now that microprocessor software products are no longer an
active part of the BCS strategic direction, the final
disposition of the product group is up in the air.
Office Services
An aborted entry into the office automation market
provides a second example of BCS product based strategic
management and planning.
In 1982, at the direction of the president of BCS, an
office services group was created. The intent was to sell
consulting services, IBM host-based computing products, and
Boeing developed software that would enable connectivity
between different office systems. There was one groundrule
established going into the venture: the group could only
sell products that already existed within Boeing. The
underlying motive, however, was to try to enhance time-
sales. This could be accomplished, it was felt, by selling
an IBM time-sharing product, PROFS, which Boeing was using
and IBM was not yet selling commercially. Labor
consultation would be sold using IBM's products as leverage.
In addition, the consultants would be trained to do office
systems requirements studies, systems design, etc. But,
there was a second underlying strategy in all this. BCS
senior management believed that they could gain access
"through the office" to companies that they could not
otherwise penetrate. Then once inside, the salesforce could
leverage the entire BCS product line where appropriate.
In concept this seemed like a good strategy.
Consultants said the market for office information services
was huge and that a corporation could achieve a 15 per cent
improvement to the bottom line if a total office system was
implemented. There was growing consciousness among senior
executives that the majority of the workforce was now white
collar, and that achieving productivity gains in this area
was becoming more and more critical.
In fact, the strategy worked fairly well. The
organization began to generate revenue, but more importantly
the sales force began to penetrate companies where they had
no previous success. However, there was confusion as to who
the customer really was, what the market strategy really
was, and how the product should be handled. Office
services, like software did not fit neatly into the industry
market strategy. It cut across all industries.
Concurrently, revenues in the other product sectors began to
spiral downward and cost reductions had to be made. The
market staff saw office services as a small frog in a big
pond, and they needed just the opposite. After
approximately a year of fairly successful operation the
group was disbanded.
The strategy to rescue time-sharing and gain access to
new companies through office services served to mask the
basic issue. There was no time-sharing strategy and no
strategy to cultivate new customers. Rather than looking to
a new market to solve these problems the organizational
strategy should have addressed them directly.
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Chapter Summary
The average annual revenue growth rate for the computer
services industry is predicted to be between 15 and 20
percent a year through 1991.7 It is an industry driven by
technology, which in turn drives the needs of the customer
and the market. It is in a "strategically favorable
position--in the center of the information business,
occupying the middle ground between conduit and content,
between medium and the message."8 As a result, computing
services companies are in a good position to take advantage
of the trends that change computing: systems integration,
outside processing, and consulting, design and programming
assistance in automating in-house functions. The stronger
the ties between the computer services company and the
hardware/software manufacturers, the greater the leverage.
The computer services company must avoid developing and
executing strategic plans that are based solely on market
trends and technology; they change too fast. Instead,
companies must develop strategies that use technology and
market trends to build on their strengths. They should then
supplement their weaknesses through alliances and teaming
arrangements.
7. Robert G. Atkins, U.S. Industrial Outlook 1987,
September 1986.
8. Stephen T. McClellan, Investment Merits, Data Services
Industry, Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 14, May 1987.
CHAPTER 3
STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS
Managing change is one of the most critical challenges
facing management today. Pulled by the equally strong
forces of current operational needs and future strategic
direction, corporate managements have to make critical
decisions now for both today and tomorrow. Strategic
planning is meant to harness present demands to a vision of
the future.9
This chapter will trace the history of BCS,
specifically CSG, from its formation in 1970 through early
1988. The goals, objectives and strategies that are a part
of this history will be recounted in the context in which
they occurred. Future strategic directions will follow the
historical account.
The Beginning of BCS
In late 1968, T Wilson, then Chairman and CEO of the
Boeing Company, commissioned a corporate study to evaluate
9. Rochelle O'Connor, Facing Strategic Issues: New Planning
Guides and Practices, The Conference Board Report No. 867,
1985.
whether it would make sense to consolidate all existing
computing resources into a single business unit within
Boeing. Prior to this time all data processing hardware and
support services were integrated into individual product or
operating divisions throughout the company. This was not of
great concern when data processing was in its infancy, but,
as computing became more and more sophisticated and greater
expenditures were made, the need to manage and control these
resources became more important.
Concurrently, the aerospace industry in general, more
specifically Boeing, was entering a severe depression. The
SST had recently been canceled; there was a significant
downturn in commercial jet aircraft sales; and government
awarded contracts were dwindling. Employment at Boeing in
the Seattle area fell from 101,554 in January 1968 to 37,200
in October 1971. T Wilson was extremely concerned about the
loss of highly skilled data processing people. In his
words, "all the goods ones were leaving the sinking ship".
In order to stop "the bleeding, take advantage of the skills
we had, and to diversify into the commercial market," BCS
was formed. Although the main objective was to "develop an
organization which would be attractive enough to retain the
higher class people, as opposed to the mediocre ones," no
less important was the desire to expand into the commercial
computing services marketplace.10
In early 1970 a corporate charter was drafted which
effectively established Boeing Computer Services, Inc. as a
wholly owned subsidiary of the Boeing Company. It was
decided that BCS should be a separate entity, i.e. not a
division of Boeing, in order to demonstrate to the world
that "we meant business".
The objectives associated with the formation of Boeing
Computer Services were:
-Gain control of data processing costs
-Reduce the unit costs of computing
-Provide advancing technology throughout the
entire Boeing Company
-Provide the capabilities to plan, design, and
implement Boeing-wide systems
-Balance machine utilization in all locations
-Develop standards and a standard approach to
computing
-Attract and retain the most qualified people
-Gain better utilization of scare technical skills
-Diversify the Boeing business base
-Compete in the commercial marketplace
10. T. A. Wilson, retired Chairman, The Boeing Company,
interview by the authortape recording, by telephone from
Boston, MA, March 1, 1988.
To further emphasize the importance of the new
organization, Bob Tharrington, then BCS president, and a
portion of his immediate staff were headquartered in New
Jersey. The intent was to give the overall appearance of
separation from Boeing corporate offices in Seattle,
Washington. In addition, primary markets for external
sales, financial services, banking and federal systems were
centered in the east.
The First Decade 1970-1980
organization
Figures 5a and 5b graphically illustrate the evolution
of BCS between 1970 and 1980. The chart reflects a period
of tremendous organizational growth and change. New market
opportunities and the associated attempts to sell products
into these markets had a direct impact upon the structure of
the organization. Throughout the 1970's, both the
commercial and government business segments were managed and
organized in one organization. In the early 1980's, the
business units were functionally separated into two
organizations, hence two distinct profit centers.
1970
In 1970 the company was divided into four districts,
keyed to four geographic locations where Boeing had computer
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installations: Northeast, Southeast, Midwest, and
Northwest. These districts combined resources that
supported both Boeing internally as well as the commercial
and government markets. At this time no formal sales force
existed. Commercial sales relied on Boeing's ability to
sell excess data processing capacity (time-sharing) based on
name, reputation, and image alone.
1970-1973
Between 1970 and 1973, three new organizations were
formed to address emerging markets. The first, G.E.M.,
based in Washington D.C., was oriented toward the
Government, Education, and Medical markets. SAMA, Space and
Military Applications Division, was established to focus on
NASA and DoD. The third, Network Services, was based in
Seattle to provide telecommunications support to Boeing and
commercial customers. The salesforce had grown from zero to
thirty-nine, with the majority of these people located in
the Washington D.C. metropolitan area supporting government
opportunities. This represents the first major investment
made by the company to actively pursue external business.
In 1973, two new business opportunities were initiated.
First, the Office of Financial Services heralded Boeing's
entry into the financial and banking services industry. The
Leader Corporation, a company similar to ADP, was Boeing's
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first acquisition to supplement banking service offerings.
Financial and banking services would continue to play a role
until 1985 when it was decided to abandon this commercial
market segment. The second organization created in 1973 was
the consulting group. It provided systems analysis and
design support, specialized computing labor services and
general systems consultation. Today this organization is
still am important part of BCS' service offering.
1974-1975
Beginning in 1974 more significant changes took place.
The acquisition of SCS, a small data processing firm located
in Alaska, and Tenant and Song, a similar company located in
Canada, were completed. SCS supported expanding markets in
Alaska, while Tenant and Song provided the basis for the
formation of BCS of Canada, Ltd. A fourth acquisition,
Androcor Inc., was a software firm based in Chicago, that
specialized in "point of sale" applications. SCS and The
Leader Corporation, as well as BCS of Canada were eventually
phased into BCS. In 1975 a decision was reached to shut
down Androcor Inc. as the software product hoped for never
really materialized.
A new division was formed in 1974--Education and
Training. Training activities began as a product line with
the formation of BCS and then in 1974 were brought to
maturity with divisional status. By the end of 1975 the
salesforce stood at ninety-eight. Commercial sales were
dependent upon the time-sharing business, both business and
scientific, while the government time-sharing market
continued to expand. Both proved to be quite profitable. In
addition, Education and Training was doing an outstanding
job not only training Boeing employees, but in capturing
outside contracts at companies such as Ford and GM.
1976-1980
Between 1976 and 1980 things began to change quickly.
Some structural changes were made to enhance distinctions
between the various product and service offerings. That is,
an attempt was made to concentrate a single product or
service into one group, or to focus on a specific
customer/market segment. Until this time there had been no
need to structurally separate BCS support to Boeing from the
commercial and government services activities. In 1976 the
Boeing Commercial Airplane Company and Boeing Aerospace
Corporation Support Districts were formed to provide
dedicated support to the Boeing customer.
This restructuring resulted in the consolidation of
commercial services in the west into a stand-alone
organization-the Western Region. The Western Region was
supposed to concentrate on expanding commercial
opportunities. Whether this restructuring strategy resulted
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in greater efficiency with regard to support to Boeing, or
improved success in the commercial marketplace is unclear.
Whatever the reason (perhaps a combination of both) in 1979
the entire sales organization was restructured into regions
to "further enhance and strengthen our support to our
commercial customers".
Boeing Computer Services was unincorporated in late
1978 and granted full status as a Boeing operating division.
This was significant in that BCS was now recognized by
corporate management as a mature contributing business, no
longer a business in its infancy.
By 1980 the Federal Systems Group (FSG) had matured to
include SAMA (Space and Military Applications), ETA
(Engineering Technology Applications), Government Systems
and the Computing Support Services Division (CSSD).
Commercial Services was now more or less organized
geographically into regions, with Financial Services
remaining a separate group. Network Services also stood on
its own. BCS which began the 1970's with 2,900 employees,
no sales force and a modest organizational structure, ended
the decade with 6,700 employees (the majority of the 6,700
supporting Boeing internally), 133 sales people, and an
accompanying organizational structure made up of twenty-five
support districts and twenty-five general managers.
Culture-Style-Processes
Although BCS was established as a subsidiary of Boeing
and handled as a separate operating entity, the Boeing
culture, style, mode of operation, policies, and processes
naturally became an integral part of BCS. Personnel
policies, performance measures, accounting and financial
procedures, compensation policies, etc., were all the same
as in the rest of Boeing. The notable exception was the
sales commission plan and Quota Club, both of which rewarded
top sales performers in CSG. The culture was that of a high
technology aerospace firm with a heavy orientation toward
the government sector. Although successful in the
commercial services market throughout the 1970's due
primarily to time-sharing, as we shall see later, the strong
influence of the Boeing culture on BCS may in part have
inhibited future growth. It certainly impacted the
performance of the BCS subsidiaries during the 1970's.
These subsidiaries were relatively unsuccessful, perhaps
because BCS management attempted to run these small firms
like Boeing, recognizing too late the incompatibility in
culture and style.
Structure
Initially BCS was structured in a fashion that
conveniently complemented the existing Boeing computing data
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centers located around the country: geographic districts.
As the company grew during the seventies, this geographic
orientation began to shift to a market driven structure.
Identification of markets that required heavy data
processing, i.e. financial and governmental, focused
increased emphasis on new organizations. As there was no
specific product with the Boeing name on it being marketed
at this time (most sales were based on labor and time-
sharing) no attempt was made to organize along product
lines. Emphasis was placed on improving support to Boeing
during these years. The capabilities, skills, and resources
inherent in BCS were directed toward building new systems to
support the development of the 757 and 767 airplanes, as
well as designing and implementing systems for use in
bidding and winning government contracts. However, a
substantial amount of senior management time and attention
was concentrated on developing the external market. While
profits from sales were put back into the company to
encourage growth (subsidiaries), low outside investment from
Boeing corporate was received during this time.
The Transition Years 1980-1982
Management Transition
In 1980 a significant change took place. Bob Dryden,
formerly of IBM, was brought in as executive vice president
of Boeing Computer Services. This demonstrated two things:
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Boeing had recognized that information technology had become
a mature business and it offered a good opportunity for
further diversification and growth. The industry
connections that Dryden brought to BCS gave a clear signal
that emphasis would be placed on developing outside markets.
As a result of his tenure at IBM, Dryden brought marketing
expertise, competitive intelligence, strategic planning
experience and technical capability to Boeing.
Strategic Focus
A strategic management staff, reporting to Dryden,
responsible for developing business plans, operating plans,
and business strategy was created. In fact, this proved to
be the beginning of a separate strategic planning process
for CSG. Internal factors such as corporate priorities,
values, and cost would be considered as part of the
strategic plan. In addition, for the first time,
consideration was given to the external environment;
including the economy, market, technology, competition, and
political policy. Strategic plans would become an integral
part of the overall planning cycle in BCS. Appendix A
details this process.
New Management Impact
The impact Bob Dryden had on the organization was not
felt immediately. Initially minor changes were made to the
organizational structure in order to accommodate new
personnel and growth within BCS. Toward the end of 1982
more significant organizational changes would take place to
prepare BCS for strategic redirection. Emphasis continued
to be placed primarily on support to the internal Boeing
customer. Dryden had brought a bit of IBM culture into
Boeing and at the same time was attempting to adapt to the
Boeing culture of BCS. It was critical that he gain
acceptance among his peers in the other operating divisions
of Boeing. This is why strong emphasis was placed on
internal services and support.
While long range strategic planning took place at
executive levels throughout the 1970's, changes began to
take place in the way BCS described future external markets
and directions. The strategic planning process in BCS had
been one that functioned from two to ten years in the
future. It was concerned with identifying and understanding
trends and changes in the economy, business, personal, and
political environment in order to determine what BCS should
do in response. It focused on determining what to do--
rather than how to do it.
The Dryden redirection altered the strategic planning
process in BCS. Planning was now focused on the next few
months through the next five years. Management became
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concerned with identifying the industries and service
offerings that would produce near term revenue and profit,
in addition to those with long term benefit. Planning
became dependant upon, and solicited input from BCS internal
and field sources. It was truly an attempt to get BCS
positioned for long term success, within the constraints of
near term performance requirements.
Emerging Technologies
In the early 1980's emerging technologies had a
dramatic impact and influence on the end-user computing
environment. Data processing power was moving from the
mainframe in either demand batch or on-line mode to
distributed processors and the desktop with the introduction
of personal computers. Application software had evolved
from machine code and standard languages in the 1960's and
1970's to high level languages of the early 1980's. As the
technology changed so did the sophistication of the end
user. The customer had begun to make the transition from
being solely a data processing technician, to a computing
professional, to the non-professional and management.
Emergence of a Strategic Plan 1982-1983
Highlights
Now that technology had begun to drive processing from
centralized mainframes out to dispersed systems with more
and more non-technical users, there was a growing
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recognition that systems should be integrated. The BCS
service offering that addressed this need was stated as, "a
high technology, networked, and integrated remote computing
delivery service (RCS) complemented by professional support.
The service will include distributed information services
utilizing both extended utility and specialized work
stations to satisfy the needs of clerical workers,
management, data processing and engineering
professionals."11 The professional services would focus on
RCS support systems design and verification, systems
engineering, systems management and training. Mission
oriented facilities management for the federal government
would be emphasized and extended into the commercial
customer market.
The published strategic plan on the commercial and
government side of the business was to "establish permanent
presence in the Fortune 500 accounts and major federal
agencies." This was to be accomplished by vertical and
horizontal account penetration by a "stable and skilled
sales force supported by highly skilled technical and
professional personnel."12 The strategic objective was on
penetration and growth.
Markets were divided into three segments. Tier one
11. 1982-1983 BCS Commercial Strategies Presentation.
12. Ibid.
emphasis was on the federal government, energy,
manufacturing, and communications. Tier two, which had less
emphasis, was banking and finance. Tier three consisted of
areas under study for future consideration. Within each
industry group specific service offerings were established:
time-sharing, professional services, (system design and
maintenance, consulting, training) network services, and
facilities management. Two new service offerings, software
products and office services, were established in 1983. The
Software Products Group, headed by a newly hired ex-IBM
employee was formed to "move BCS strongly into the software
products market place."13 The Software Products Group
reported directly to Dryden and included marketing, sales,
development, and production of all BCS software products.
This organization, its structure and reporting relationship,
violated the intent of the vertical industry matrix and
further confused who had profit responsibility, hence
accountability, for commercial services. The office
services group reported to the vice president of CSG and was
established to sell office automation consultation and
workstation communications software across all industries.
Products were matrixed across industry groups
indicated in Figures 6 and 7. However, the regional
district reporting structure put in place in the late 1970's
13. BCS Management Information Bulletin, 1, July 1983.
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remained. In the near term, investments would be limited to
product and internal resource development. Internal
resource development would include motivational programs,
training and job rotation. Internal business systems would
be upgraded and "an aggressive investment would be made in
the development of productivity tools and processes."l14 The
ultimate goal was to become a $500,000,000 company in 1985
with 20 percent return on investment.
New senior management, combined with rapidly changing
technologies, was beginning to have an effect on the
products, processes and planning procedures within BCS. BCS
had evolved and matured as the industry at large matured.
It was obvious that in order to be competitive BCS had to
have a strategy, goals, objectives and tactics flexible
enough to meet market requirements. The 1982-1983 strategic
plan was the first step toward achieving planned growth.
Growth Years 1984-1986
Environment
The challenge that faced BCS entering 1984 was that of
executing the strategic objectives announced in 1983. BCS
had been reorganized into three major functional groups:
the Boeing Support Group, Federal Systems Group, and
Commercial Services Group. The Commercial Services Group
14. 1982-1983 BCS Commercial Strategies Presentation.
was restructured internally to address the market
opportunities that presented themselves to BCS. Business
segments reporting to the vice-president of CSG were,
network services, systems management, office services,
information services, financial services, and professional
services. A sales organization responsible for commercial
sales, federal teleprocessing sales, sales administration,
and marketing communications reported to the vice-president.
Marketing responsibility for commercial services was
separate from the sales group and also reported directly to
the vice-president. The Software Products Group was not
part of CSG, but was in the same markets and selling to the
same customer base.
Another factor that had to be taken into account at
this time was the rapidly diminishing time-sharing business.
This problem was not unique to BCS. "General Electric sold
off its failing computer manufacturing line in 1970. It
seemed to be headed for another computer disaster in 1983,
when its time-sharing business began to crash. When
computing power became cheaper to own, nobody needed time-
sharing".15 Although experts had been predicting the
decline in time-sharing sales for some time, no one
anticipated how quickly the market would drop off. BCS was
caught in the middle. In 1983 an organization had been
15. Alyssa A. Lappen, "Messenger of the gods", Forbes, 21
March, 1988.
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created to strategically place new products and services in
the market. The combination of time-sharing drying up, and
BCS management underestimating the length of time it would
take to bring new products to market created an unexpected
decline in revenues and profits.
In addition to the decline in time-sharing sales, a
second problem occurred. BCS had for some time counted on
the petroleum industry (energy) for substantial revenues in
scientific computing time sales. Boeing was essentially the
"only game in town" when it came to providing the petroleum
companies sophisticated geological analysis data using
supercomputers. The supercomputer had been acquired for
internal Boeing use and was running under capacity. This
resulted in very high profit margins for time sales. In
1984 the bottom fell out of the energy market, limiting the
need for exploration. No exploration meant no need for
supercomputing.
Growth Plan
On May 3, 1985 Frank Shrontz, recently appointed
President of the Boeing Company, posed the following
question to BCS senior management, "How fast could Boeing
Computer Services prime business grow without limits on
investment?" This was not the first time a question of this
nature had been asked, but it was different in that no
significant restrictions on investment were imposed.
Shrontz was encouraging diversification and growth in BCS in
order to compensate for decreasing margins in other business
segments; commercial airplanes and fixed price government
contracts. The overall objective was simply to increase
earnings. Internal growth was emphasized as opposed to
growth that could be achieved through outside acquisitions.
The task was now to put together a comprehensive yet
realistic growth plan, consistent with company objectives,
that would identify potential opportunities for sales
growth.
In October 1985, BCS management returned to corporate
offices with a report that established a top level dollar
value growth target and provided some general direction for
meeting this objective. The growth opportunities should be
consistent with company long term goals:
Growth in selected markets
-government
-manufacturing
-energy
-selected cross industry opportunities
Net profit contribution
Leadership and quality image
Specifically it was agreed that BCS external sales
(government and commercial) should be in the $1.2 billion
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annual range by 1990. Two markets should be identified and
concentrated on. Only areas of expertise and past success
should be developed. Focus was on internal growth, although
a "well-suited" acquisition would be acceptable if it
supported product development inside Boeing. Finally, the
initial incremental investment required to achieve growth
should be moderate, not unlimited. Twelve specific areas of
opportunity, seven within manufacturing and five in the
government sector, were identified.
Booz Allen and Hamilton was brought in to review the
business case, including revenue projections, market
analysis, investment and execution risks. BAH reported back
in April 1986 that the $1.2 billion growth plan seemed
extremely aggressive, citing that "no computer
service/software firm the size of BCS had grown that
rapidly" or had pursued twelve diverse opportunities
simultaneously. They also noted that BCS was particularly
weak in the areas of marketing and sales. The plan was
adjusted downward to $1.0 billion by 1990 and market
opportunities limited to six. On May 8, 1986 corporate
executive council approved the growth plan and committed to
an up-front investment.
organization
In an effort to follow the intent of the Growth Plan
and to focus attention on specific markets, both CSG and the
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Federal Services Group (now known as Government Information
Services) reorganized. Commercial sales operations was
restructured to concentrate the companies resources on two
specific industry segments: energy and manufacturing.
Commercial sales and marketing were combined into one group,
reporting to the vice-president of CSG. All sales and
marketing activities supporting government systems became a
part of the Government Information Services group. The
Software Products Group was transferred into CSG, rather
than reporting directly to the company president. A new
group, Strategic Alliances was formed.
Emphasis on growth forced CSG into an era of continual
reorganization. Successive changes of this nature are in
direct contrast to the more stable organizational structure
typically found at Boeing. Although the aerospace business
is cyclical, the structure tends to remain much the same
over time. In fact, within BCS the Boeing Support Group
remained relatively unchanged during this same period.
The restructuring that took place in CSG and in
Government Information Services gave them the appearance of
a very large company when in fact the external side of BCS
remained quite moderate in terms of revenues. The massive
structure put in place to accommodate growth suited the
major systems contracts with the federal government but made
flexibility difficult with regard to commercial customers
and the market. overhead costs increased. The sheer size
and structure of the organization made product development
cumbersome, therefore windows of opportunity could easily be
missed. This put BCS at a disadvantage in the
microprocessor software products market. It led them to
develop commercial software products that had a longer
product life, were produced in lower volume, but at a higher
cost to the customer.
Even during this growth period, the BCS culture was
still Boeing, and the management style had not changed.
Internal capabilities continued to keep pace with
technology. The planning process had been altered somewhat
with the inclusion of Booz Allen and Hamilton in the
strategic growth plan. However, there was some question as
to whether product plans took best advantage of BCS skills
and strengths, or appeared attractive due only to market
trends. The behavior was that of a market driven company
yet the question being asked was, how do I take the products
I have and put them into the market? The answer seemed to
be, find out what the market wants and then paint your
products that color.
Strategic Redirection 1987-1988
Retrenching
By the end of 1986 it had become apparent that BCS
markets were softening and that the growth plan needed to be
reevaluated. The services industry was dramatically lagging
the hardware industry.- The businese mix was changing
between commercial and government, with the government
business now playing a more dominant role. However, BCS was
experiencing unanticipated delays in government contract
awards. A lower investment budget was proposed that
represented a more focused strategy. Internally BCS,
specifically CSG, began to reduce internal costs by
significantly reducing headcount and overhead. The goal for
the external business segment was to break even in 1988.
Increased emphasis was placed on developing alliances in
order to leverage available resources and bring many varied
skills to bear on large complex projects. The objective of
becoming a $1.0 billion business by 1990 was postponed until
1991.
Organization
At Dryden's request a BCS task force was established to
study the external business segment and make recommendations
to improve the effectiveness of the organization. The
result was a proposal to establish a BCS corporate position,
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reporting to Dryden that would direct marketing, market
research, advertising, and evaluate potential acquisitions,
teaming arrangements, and review investments. This
position, in fact, was never filled. Instead, in March
1987, to strengthen the senior management team in commercial
sales and government, Mike Hallman, former IBM vice
president was hired and appointed vice president of BCS-CSG
and GIS. Hallman, with extensive sales and marketing
experience, would obviously strengthen these disciplines in
BCS. However, rather than serving as a strategic manager
(corporate development) for Dryden, Hallman was given line
management responsibility. The first change was to once
again reorganize, this time by major industry, not by
products, i.e. software, computer integrated manufacturing,
financial services etc. The industry orientation would
focus on manufacturing and engineering-scientific
businesses. It was felt that this would allow BCS products
to be sold vertically within an industry and horizontally
across industries. Additionally, marketing would no longer
be a staff function serving all products and services. It
would now be a specialized task supporting individual
industry groups, with a small centralized marketing staff.
This change would not last long because in January 1988
another reorganization would take place. By that time
Hallman had been promoted to President of Boeing Computer
Services. He had had little time to implement the sales and
marketing skills and strategies he brought to BCS.
Throughout the second half of 1987 the commercial
business continued to deteriorate. Management began to
reduce costs, beginning with administrative support
organizations and ending with reductions in sales and
marketing. However, reductions did not take place quickly
enough to protect the established profit targets. The
general assessment of performance over the past two years
was that the growth plan was too ambitious, the product set
was too broad, and in-house skills did not support the
shifting product mix. A more conservative approach to the
commercial business was emphasized: consolidate profitable
core offerings, while "harvesting" commodity services such
as time-sharing and education and training; focus on
manufacturing software and supercomputing. The sales and
marketing organization needed to be "revitalized" and
greater emphasis would be placed on strategic development
and marketing alliances.
The appointment of a new vice president of CSG in March
1988, led to a product oriented restructuring in the
manufacturing industry segment, while engineering-scientific
and super-computing were combined. It was believed that
structuring around products would encourage profit and loss
accountability where none had existed before. It would also
facilitate a shift from a strategic plan to a more tactical
view in 1988.
The tactical approach is focused specifically on
products with the "objective of minimizing the number of
products in order to optimize each product business unit."16
Each product will be evaluated to see if it has enough value
in its own right to be part of the eventual strategy. The
belief is that this will enable each product to fail or
succeed in the marketplace rather than fail or succeed
trying to get out into the market. If products succeed in
the market fine, if not, fine.. .but at least management will
know. As stated by the current vice president of CSG, " the
strategic approach to a business plan is not sacred
now.. .tactics are." 17
Chapter Summary
The evolution of BCS since its formation in 1970 can be
summarized in terms of the "eras" described above. During
the 1970's BCS was in its infancy. While emphasis was
placed on skill retention and providing high quality support
to the Boeing Company, commercial and government sales
activities received a substantial amount of management
16. J. P. Farmer, Vice President, BCS Commercial Services
Group, interview by the author, tape recording, Bellevue,
WA, January 19, 1988.
17. Ibid.
attention. Excess in-house mainframe time (commercial and
scientific) was the profitable stable product. Salesmen
sold data processing, pure and simple.
Then in 1980 things began to change. Bob Dryden began
to place more emphasis on external sales. To expand the
existing business base a fairly complex product strategy was
developed. Dryden envisioned a product line strategy for
BCS that would consist of microprocessor software, systems
integration, telecommunications and office automation.
These products were most important with all others taking a
back seat.
Problems arose due to the fact that the vice president
of CSG believed in a different strategy. He wanted to build
an overall plan where all components complemented one
another. It was a matrix approach to product management
with sales and marketing focused vertically on the
manufacturing, energy, and government business segments.
Products such as office automation, which did not fit neatly
into this strategy were kept separate organizationally,
floundered and eventually were discontinued. Meanwhile,
time-sharing and energy began to fade, and planned new
business ventures did not become profitable as quickly as
expected.
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The investment dollars allocated to CSG and Government
Information Services during the growth period increased over
ten times. The investment has paid off on the government
side, with contract awards, both in numbers won and in
dollar value awarded, tracking with planned targets. Some
hold that too much investment, over too short a period of
time in CSG, was not good for growth because it forced
management to make "big" decisions rather than more modest,
capability driven decisions. Others would argue this point.
BCS management was forced to reevaluate the growth strategy
because objectives were not been met. The result has been
the development of a smaller, more manageable strategy that
is based on core businesses that can be profitable and
growth oriented. Recent restructuring has been undertaken
to bring costs in line with expectations of sales.
Management, in scaling down the organization, is taking a
proactive position, rather than the reactive stance that
kicked-off the growth years. BCS president, Mike Hallman
views 1988 as a "year to establish our confidence in what we
are doing. We clearly believe we are in the right business
in the government arena. In the commercial arena our
objective now is to really stabilize our business so that we
can begin to show success and establish a confidence
level. "18 The key to success will be the ability to
execute. Execution is the critical success factor for BCS
external sales in 1988.
18. Interview with Mike Hallman, Boeing Computer Services
Online, December 1987, Volume 3, No. 9.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS
"The goal of planning is to create the future, not to
forecast it." 19
This chapter will analyze the results of strategies
developed by BCS to establish itself as a competitive force
in the computing services industry. Emphasis will be placed
on the years 1983 through 1988, although events that
occurred prior to that time will be referenced.
Should BCS attempt to compete in the computer services
business?
Time and time again, while conducting thesis interviews
and doing thesis research the same question kept coming up,
"should BCS even be in the commercial computer services
business?" Each time the question was raised I would arrive
at the same conclusion; a resounding yes. In the 1988 sales
19. Rochelle O'Connor, Facing Strategic Issues: New
Planning Guides and Practices, The Conference Board Report
No. 867, 1985.
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kick-off meeting BCS President, Mike Hallman reinforced this
by stating: "The key point I should make at the outset is
that I believe a commercial business is critical to our
success in BCS. It is critical to the overall profitability
and stability of BCS. Moreover, the external sales side of
BCS is critical to the long-term objectives of The Boeing
Company--to the extent that we can take technologies and
skills and transfer them from within Boeing to outside
Boeing and visa versa."2 0
This may seem strange given the difficult time BCS has
had in sustaining itself in this endeavor. In fact if the
only consideration is the bottom line then the obvious
strategic direction would be to adopt exit strategies.
However, I am convinced that a company such as Boeing must
maintain technological leadership if it is to remain
competitive in all aspects of its business, from airplanes
to electronics to space. Government Information Services
and the Commercial Services Group serve as conduits to the
external environment, facilitating a two way transfer of
technology: from Boeing out to the industry, and from the
industry into Boeing. This technology transfer, something
that cannot be quantified in terms of dollars and cents, is
the real benefit of sustaining a commercial services
organization. This should in no way compromise the fact
20. Interview with Mike Hallman, Boeing Computer Services
Online, February 1988.
that BCS can and should be more successful when it comes to
establishing market presence, achieving competitive
advantage and generating substantial revenues through the
sale of its products and services.
Therefore, the analysis and recommendations that
follow will be based on the premise that Boeing Computer
Services should be in the commercial computer services
industry. The analysis will demonstrate that although the
business is right for Boeing, significant improvements can
and should be made to ensure future success.
Assessment of Strategy
Planning Process
The planning process serves to establish the company's
mission, goals and objectives, strategies, programs and
resource requirements, that will enable the organization to
best cope with and influence an uncertain future.21 A firm
will benefit from the planning system if all levels of
management are involved.
The process described in Appendix A ties strategic
plans to the company operating plans such that management
can effectively determine the resources required to carry
out the planned strategies. Planning in BCS begins as a top
21. William R. King and David I. Cleland, Strategic
Planning and Policy (New York: Van nostrand Reinhold
Company, 1978)
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down process with the creation of the strategy document, and
concludes with an operating plan that is built from the
bottom up. Since the strategy document is updated annually
and the operating plan updated quarterly, adjustments can be
made to keep the organization aligned with both long term
vision and short term goals. A benefit in this process is
that all levels of management are involved so that planning
becomes part of the day to day operation of the
organization.
However, there is a downside to this process as it is
practiced in BCS. The system lacks a mechanism that holds
all levels of management accountable for implementation of
the strategic plan. Executive management is rewarded or
penalized based on performance relative to the operating
plan. Weighted specific performance measures include
execution of current business, long term strategy,
acquisition of new business and resource management.
Achievement of short term goals however, often overrides the
strategic direction established at top levels for the
organization. There is less incentive for executive
management to stick to the strategy, but rather more
incentive to manage "by the numbers". The result is that
tactics become more important than strategy. The bottom
line and profitability become more important than
establishing market presence, achieving product acceptance,
71
and gaining competitive advantage. There is no strategic
management or execution of the plan taking place on a day to
day basis at all levels.
The Strategic Plan
BCS documented an important in-depth commercial
strategy in 1983.22 It began with a vision and objectives
for the commercial services business and followed with an
assessment of the external and internal business environment
as applied to the computer services industry. The document
included a fairly extensive study of the external
environment: economy, market, technology, competition,
political, and sociological factors. The internal analysis
focused on Boeing corporate priorities, management values,
cost, and marketing. Strategies were stated in terms of:
primary objectives, "establish permanent presence in the
Fortune 500 extended accounts and major federal
agencies"... "to be accomplished by vertical and horizontal
account penetration;" market objectives, "business
management systems, engineering, and information
services,...energy, manufacturing, financial, and
communications industries;" and services offerings, "high
technology, networked, and integrated remote computing
delivery service complimented by professional services."
Laying out this strategic plan more or less formalized what
22. BCS Commercial Strategies, 1982/83. Boeing Limited
document.
the commercial and government businesses had evolved into
during the 1970's. BCS was already selling or had sold into
most of these markets and had founded these sales primarily
on remote computing services.
Subsequent plans, including the Growth Plan of 1985,
contained all of the same elements with minor variations.
One year the plan would emphasize vertical market
integration by industry, while the next year it would next
focus on products for horizontal penetration into the
market. Some industries were deleted over time; medical
services and financial services, while one was added; the
communications industry. Others stayed in the plan;
manufacturing, engineering, and energy, while high
technology (hardware and software) market was completely
ignored.
On the product side the same thing occurred. Products
like microprocessor software and office services were
discontinued. Time-sharing declined as technology changed.
BCS' software integration tools (Axxyz and PMS) underwent a
complete transformation from the time they first appeared in
1983 to their inclusion in the 1988 plan. Super-computing,
consulting services, and education and training stayed in
the plan relatively unchanged.
It seems ironic that BCS changed its organizational
structure each time the strategic plan shifted emphasis from
industry to product, even though the specific industries and
products remained the same. Constant reorganization implies
that management believed that the way the producing groups
were organized had a direct bearing on how effectively they
could get their products into the marketplace. Is it
necessary for the organization to mirror the market? You
can continually rearrange the deck chairs on a ship and end
up with a better view, but it is still the same ship,
heading for the same port.
Strategic Management
The shortcoming in the strategic planning process for
BCS is in the execution and management of the plan. Every
strategy describes in detail what it is the company intends
to do and where it intends to end up, but never how it is
going to get there. Strategic management has not become a
part of the day to day operation of the company. This is
why management has had to resort to a tactical approach in
1988 and use it as a year of recovery.
The inability to execute the Growth Plan or the office
automation strategy, to accurately forecast the decline in
time-sharing and not have one or more replacement products
in the pipeline, highlight this shortcoming. Despite the
emphasis on planning, reorganization and product
development, something is still missing. Why is execution
such a problem?
Execution starts at the top. If management is not
committed to the overall strategic vision for the company
then others in the organization will have no incntive to
implement the plan. BCS-CSG appears to be operating on the
assumption that creating the strategic plan is the
objective, as opposed to the objective being the
implementation of the plan. A lack of accountability in the
system provides little impetus for execution. It has been
stated by the vice president of CSG that the recent
reorganization (aligning the organization by individual,
self-contained, product groups) will force everynne to be
accountable for the success or failure of the product. This
is still a product orientation, not a management
orientation. Accountability for the success or failure of a
specific product is not the solution. If management is
committed to stay in the commercial computing services
industry because, as stated, it is good for Boeing
(technology transfer) and a profitable business to be in,
accountability must be moved higher up the ladder. Senior
management must be held accountability for the success or
failure of the organization at large. Management should
continually be asking, "if this were my own company would I
run it this way?". In reality, everyone in the organization
should have an ownership attitude. This breeds commitment.
This is a business which should encourage risk-taking and
entrepreneurial spirit, neither of which are an important
part of the Boeing culture.
The conflict is further complicated because Boeing
Computer Services is chartered to serve two masters; the
external market, and The Boeing Company. In executing the
commercial and government strategies, management must
constantly balance external growth with reliable, cost
effective internal Boeing support. The day to day
management challenge inherent in one, is not always
compatible with the other. The dominant influence of the
internal Boeing customer has made quick reactions to the
external market and customers difficult. This has often
slowed decision making and made entry into new markets
cumbersome. On the other hand, the external commercial
business, in relation to other Boeing businesses appears
quite modest in terms of dollar value. Decisions that are
made regarding investments or expenditures of funds are
sometimes made quite hastily because in the overall scheme
of things they are not viewed as significant. Either way,
execution is hampered.
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Marketing and Sales
Mike Hallman, President of BCS, has established
execution as one of his critical success factors for BCS in
1988. However, even with faultless execution, there are
still some obvious holes in the strategy that will prevent
the Commercial Services Group from achieving success.' Two
glaring weaknesses in the organization are marketing and
sales.
Marketing
How can a company hoping to compete in the external
market do so without an effective sales and marketing
function? Through 1987 there was a centralized marketing
staff located in Vienna, Virginia, some 3,000 miles from the
product groups in Seattle. Up until 1983 this might have
been a satisfactory arrangement because much of the
marketing revolved around time-sharing services which were
located in Vienna. When the product strategy began to shift
toward software and professional services, both based in
Seattle, marketing support was not readily accessible.
Often times a strategic approach would be developed by the
marketing group only to have a tactical decision made by
senior management in Seattle preempt the entire plan. The
last director of marketing was the seventh person to hold
that position in eight years. The size of the staff changed
dramatically over time from 100, to 60, to 40 and ultimately
15. Today there is no central marketing staff and no
competitive analysis function, rather marketing has been
decentralized and embedded in the product/line
organizations.
While senior management may have been to blame for
overriding marketing strategies, the marketing organization
was not staffed with trained professionals experienced in
the computer services industry. One CSG vice president when
asked how many people in the marketing group had prior
marketing experience said I do not know. The answer was
one.
An independent consultants study commissioned by The
Boeing Company concluded that BCS's sales and marketing were
not appropriate for highly competitive rapidly changing
markets.2 3 BCS has not fully recognized that the computer
services industry is substantially different from other
Boeing businesses. As such, it requires a totally different
marketing orientation. Name, reputation and technical
superiority are not all it takes to compete in this dynamic
market.
23. Independent Consultants Report, 11 August 1987. Boeing
Limited document.
Sales
Since 1984 the commissioned sales force has declined
from 107 to less than 30. During this same time period the
total number of people in BCS has grown from 8,200 to
11,200, with most of the growth occurring in the Boeing
support organizations or in Government Information Services.
Between 1984 and 1988 commercial revenues (CSG only)
declined by 50 percent. This seems to indicate that
management emphasis has not been directed toward selling or
revenue growth, but rather on cost reduction. This is
particularly puzzling given the corporate emphasis placed on
growth in 1985-1987, and the investment made to achieve this
objective. A strong sales force that knows and understands
the customers is essential. The emphasis has not been on
actively cultivating customers in an industry where one of
its strongest attributes is recurring revenue.24 CSG is not
customer driven: it is product driven. CSG is structured to
produce, not to sell.
To further complicate the matter, the domestic sales
team has undergone a series of internal reorganizations
driven by cost considerations, not changes in the strategic
plan. Territories have been repartitioned, management
changed, offices closed, and staffs centralized. Sales
24. Stephan T. McClellan, Investment Merits, Data Services
Industry, Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner and Smith, 14, May
1987.
people who had named national accounts suddenly found
themselves assigned industry accounts selling unfamiliar
products, often times not ready for market. Today accounts
are assigned based on which account the individual sales
person thinks he or she should have. This is not a well
thought out sales strategy.
All of this has reduced the overall effectiveness of
the salesforce. Like marketing, senior sales management was
located in Vienna, Virginia where contact with producer
groups and the customer was minimal. The result is that the
sales force lost confidence in the producers as well as in
their management.
In 1987 and 1988 renewed emphasis on cost reductions
has sent mixed signals to the sales staff. On one hand
sales quotas have not been reduced, yet the number of people
in any given region attempting to meet that quota is less
than before. Cost reductions send a signal: "you never
need to take the customer to lunch, you never need to run an
ad, you never need to hold a seminar, etc." The cost of
being in a highly competitive commercial business is that
you have to spend to sell. In 1986 when Wang Laboratories
saw a drop in profits and revenues, they too began cutting
costs. But instead of cutting sales and marketing, they
reduced the overall staff by 7,500, increased the sales
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force by twenty-five and kicked-off a new advertising
campaign. Wang balanced both sides of the equation,
something BCS management has not done. The Boeing corporate
objective for 1988 and beyond is to reduce costs while
improving short term profit. BCS has not yet figured out
how to grow and maintain profitability through selling and
marketing, while keeping costs under control.
Chapter Summary
The issues that surround the future success or failure
of Boeing Computer Services in the external marketplace are
simple yet at the same time fairly complex. There are those
in the company who would say that the return on investment
just is not there so we should kill it and move on. There
are others who would argue that although the returns are
small the ability to access outside technology reduces the
overall cost of computing to Boeing and therefore is of
significant value. Along this same line there are many who
believe that the technology itself is important enough to
keep the business alive. All of these arguments ignore the
market opportunity for growth in this services sector which
is substantial. They also ignore that fact that there have
been two market areas in which CSG has been very successful.
They are engineering and scientific services and (ESS) and
the high technology market.
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In either example the reasons for success are
relatively simple. In ESS management assembled a competent
team, provided strong leadership, established strategic
direction, was responsive to the customers needs. Success
in the high technology industry (a more detailed description
follows in Chapter 5) follows much the same pattern. What
sets these two apart from the others is that strategies were
developed, adhered to and executed. In the final analysis
it is the ability to effectively executive strategies,
linking the plan with the day to day management of the
business that is essential for success.
CHAPTER 5
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Boeing Computer Services stands at a crossroads in
1988, this year of retrenchment and confidence building.
Frank Shrontz, Chairman and CEO of the Boeing Company has
stated that cost reductions and improved profits are
corporate objectives for this year and the years beyond.
This of course must be balanced with emphasis on improved
quality, productivity, and long term strategic planning.
Profit margins on primary products such as commercial jet
airplanes and defense systems are shrinking. The management
in Boeing Computer Services must make a strategic choice.
Should they continue to reduce costs by eliminating
traditional overhead functions such as sales or marketing
and risk continued declines in revenues? Or should they
develop a strategy targeted at growth opportunities and make
a positive contribution to the Boeing bottom line?
In this chapter I will explore some of the options BCS
has relative to improving the operation and revenues
generated by the Commercial Services Group.
Recommendations
The problems identified in Chapter 4 will be reviewed
in this section with accompanying recommendations.
Planning Process
The following are inherent weaknesses in the planning
process in BCS.
-No mechanism that holds all levels of management
accountable for implementation of the plan.
-Does not reinforce the need to execute on a daily
basis.
-Does not encourage development of a long term
strategy.
The planning process should be tied to the annual
Management Performance Planning and Evaluation (MPP&E)
process (Appendix B). MPP&E is a BCS management evaluation
tool mutually agreed upon between a manager and his or her
superior. It details in narrative form, business goals and
objectives for the year and is reviewed annually. The MPP&E
combines quantitative performance targets with qualitative
objectives. Objectives stated in the MPP&E are not
necessarily projects or plans that will terminate in that
twelve month period, but may be plans or projects that carry
over several years. At year end it is used as part of the
performance appraisal system. Incorporating strategic plans
for the organization in the MPP&E would serve three
purposes: 1) It would force two way communication ensuring
that strategies were understood and agreed to by both
parties, 2) It would tie accountability for results to more
than making the numbers in the operating plan, 3) It would
encourage management to begin to take a longer view of
planning, versus a short term orientation.
Strategic Planning
Past BCS strategic planning documents share two major
problems: they are reactive, not proactive, which has
resulted in continual reorganization generating instability
and lack of confidence among employees. In BCS-CSG structure
does follow strategy. Secondly, there is no emphasis on how
to carry out the strategy, only what the strategy is. The
absence of a "how to" plan reinforces a short term focus.
First and foremost, senior management in BCS needs to
stabilize the organization. This will occur quite naturally
if a proactive strategy is developed in which all
organizations, sales, producing groups, planning staff, and
senior management play a role and have input in establishing
strategic direction.
Strategic Management
The following issues have been identified as
significant problems that prevent strategic management from
taking place in BCS.
-Apparent lack of commitment from the top. This holds
true for both BCS senior management and Boeing
executive management. It is difficult to determine
whether they seriously consider BCS-CSG to be a profit
center for Boeing or not.
-No execution.
-Lack of accountability, fueled by marginal incentives
for good performance and no penalties for poor
performance.
-No entrepreneurial spirit. Risk-takers are not
rewarded. Ownership attitude in almost non-existent.
-BCS must serve two masters, Boeing and the external
market. Therefore BCS has adopted the culture,
processes and procedures (bureaucracy) of Boeing, which
slows the decision making process.
It is essential that senior management demonstrate
commitment to the strategies developed by BCS to enhance and
grow the commercial side of the business. This commitment
needs to come from those at the highest levels of the Boeing
Company. This is the first critical success factor for BCS-
CSG.
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The second critical success factor is implementation.
All the strategy and plans in the world are only as good as
the paper they are written on if they are never carried out.
BCS must develop the ability to strategize "how to" to
compliment who, what, and when.
The third critical success factor is senior level
management accountability. An internal system that provides
incentives for execution and implementation, and penalties
for lack of execution are needed. This should be grounded
in rewards for adherence to long term strategies, not short
term goals or revenue targets. Success needs to be rewarded
over time (and lack of success penalized in the same way) to
encourage commitment to the long term strategic growth
objectives of BCS.
More difficult to carry out, but equally as important,
is the idea of creating an entrepreneurial spirit in BCS-
CSG. This is the culture of the industry at large and as
such Boeing needs to come closer to understanding that
culture. Risk-taking should be encouraged and rewarded.
This becomes critical when entering into alliances with
smaller entrepreneurial hardware and software companies that
were founded by risk-takers who have a pride in ownership.
Last and perhaps the most difficult to handle is the
fact that BCS must continue to serve two masters, The Boeing
Company and the external market. This will always be a
balancing act for management. However, serious
consideration should be given to establishing a small
company (or series of companies) in which Boeing would have
majority equity interest, and perhaps a hardware
manufacturer minority equity, to market and sell a Boeing
developed product. The staff would consist of sales,
marketing, and technical support personnel whose sole
mission is to get the product into the market and support it
once it is out there. It might be necessary to have a
product development liaison person as well. This would
accomplish two things. First it would force the product
development cycle inside Boeing to end... there would be a
finished product. Second, it would eliminate the Boeing
bureaucracy and force sales and marketing to be more
responsive to the marketplace and the customer. Decisions
could be made much more rapidly. In addition, this would
not compromise managements' intent to have BCS-CSG function
as a technology transfer pipeline between Boeing and
external industry.
Marketing
The basic problem with marketing is that it is for all
practical purposes non-existent in BCS. Contributing
factors to its ineffectiveness are:
-It has been decentralized into the product group.
-No professional, experienced staff.
-No competitive analysis conducted.
This gives the appearance that marketing is a non-
essential function in the computer services industry, when
in fact the opposite is true. BCS should engage a
consulting or headhunting service to locate and hire a
professional experienced marketing "guru", and then let the
professional put the organization together, develop
marketing strategy, and execute. More emphasis also needs
to be placed on competitive analysis within this function.
Sales
The following were recognized as problems inherent in
the sales organization.
-No stability. Disjointed function.
-Continually experiences cuts during cost reductions.
-Managements' attitude is wrong. They think that the
product sells--not the sales force.
-Sales training non-existent.
-No national sales account system.
-No common sales strategy. Each industry or market
should have a custom tailored strategy for success,
however, there should be a common "BCS" thread that
runs through it all.
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The sales problem is relatively easy to solve. It goes
back to management commitment. If management believes that a
professional, well trained sales organization is critical to
the success of BCS-CSG then most of the problems will solve
themselves.
There is however, one other issue that is not so easily
solved, that of sales strategy. This is an essential part
of the long term strategic plan for CSG. Few sales
strategies have been developed or adhered to over the years
creating confusion within the salesforce and also with the
customer. The high technology strategy, mentioned in
Chapter 4, is an example of a strategy that was developed in
1984 and continues to be executed, quite successfully today.
I would like to review it as an example of how strategic
management can and should be implemented in sales.
The High Technology Strategy
The high technology strategy is a sales plan for
working with hardware and software vendors primarily, but
not exclusively in the Boston area. It was developed in
1984 by the sales representative in the BCS Boston office as
a result of the recognition that substantial market
opportunities existed for Boeing in the high technology
industry in Boston, Silicon Valley, Minneapolis, and Texas.
Ignoring the high technology industry as a potential
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customer or marketing partner when you are in the computer
services industry is much like doing business in Detroit and
ignoring the automobile manufacturers.
This strategy encompasses all elements of conducting
business with high technology companies, including, sales
marketing, product development, alliances and resultant
distribution agreements. The key elements of the strategy
are:
-Identify companies that could potentially benefit from
Boeing's technical expertise.
-Establish a rapport with key executives of these
companies.
-Create initial sales opportunities.
-Invite key executives to visit Boeing in Seattle, meet
with BCS senior management and obtain a better
understanding of how Boeing can bring value to them.
-Obtain agreement between management in both companies
to form a working relationship.
The crux of the strategy is top down selling combined
with matching the strengths and weakness of the companies to
extract the best from both. Implementation and execution of
the strategy requires a continuous effort on the part of the
BCS sales professional. In addition to plotting account
strategy with senior executives, there are influential
technical experts within each account that need to be
nurtured. This is where teamwork selling techniques come
into play. The strategy puts emphasis on getting the right
technical personnel from BCS working with the appropriate
people within the customer accounts. Primary contacts or
coordinators within the customer accounts have been formally
established in order to ensure that the Boeing message gets
to the right people in a consistent manner. The key is that
the strategy is directed by the sales professional; the
person who knows the customer best.
The communications strategy, above, is essential to the
success of the high tech plan, in that it allows BCS to
capitalize on existing opportunities or those that develop
as a result of strategic changes or redirection within the
customer accounts. For example, a major hardware
manufacturer recently jumped into the mini-supercomputer
market by buying the rights to another vendors' hardware.
The relationship that had been developed between BCS and
this company provided an immediate opportunity for BCS to
adapt existing operating and applications software for use
on this equipment. The high technology strategy recognizes
that the industry trend toward "total solution" orientation
("we are not just a hardware company anymore") is good news
for BCS. It opens the door for OEM opportunities, joint
bids, or product incorporation. It also includes porting
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Boeing software products to manufacturers platforms, selling
labor services, (leading to future product sales) and
remarketing agreements.
Every year, within the high technology accounts, BCS
has seen significant growth over the previous year. The
keys to success in the high tech sales plan are relatively
simple. They center on the fact that once a plan was
developed in 1984 it was followed. First, and most
importantly, this is an industry strategy, not a product
strategy. The sales professional has taken time to
understand the market and the customer. The importance of
cultivating strong personal relationships with key personnel
in each account has been emphasized. Rather than
concentrating only on products, the strategy has been
"solution selling", directed toward establishing long term,
mutually beneficial, relationships with these companies.
The benefit to Boeing resulting from this sales
strategy is three-fold. First, it provides BCS with a
growing revenue base. Second, it enhances the transfer of
technology into the Boeing Company. Most importantly, it
helps keep BCS on the leading edge of the computer services
industry.
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Concluding Remarks
In any industry there are many ways you can measure
success. Some focus on short term profitability accompanied
by high margins, while others focus on low margin, long term
gains. Many emphasize maintaining competitive advantage
through the acquisition of new technology as essential for
success. To others the acquisition and retention of highly
skilled personnel ensures competitive position. Outstanding
quality, both in process and product is another indicator of
advantage or success. At The Boeing Company success is
measured as a combination of all of these factors.
Boeing Computer Services maintains competitive
advantage through technical superiority and retention of
highly skilled personnel. However, in this case, success
cannot be measured by advantage alone. In order for BCS to
gain respect within the industry and respect inside The
Boeing Company it must improve the bottom line. This must
not only be achieved through cost reduction measures or
continual redirection, but by implementing and executing a
sound strategic sales and marketing growth plan. Three
critical success factors, management commitment,
accountability, and execution will greatly enhance the
probability of future commercial profitability of Boeing
Computer Services.
APPENDIX A
The Planning Process in BCS
Planning, both forecasting of resources required to
conduct day to day business and that of defining the
strategic direction the corporation or individual operating
divisions will pursue is carried out on a annual basis. In
BCS the process begins each spring with an off-site senior
managers meeting. The off-site meeting is a forum for the
senior managers in BCS to consider any proposed changes to
the strategy developed the preceding year. At this point in
the year, it has been six to ten months since the last
"creative" attention was paid to the subject at hand. A
strategic document will be the result of the off-site
meeting. It is intended to be a broad statement of company
vision, current company objectives (short and long term) and
the strategies which will be put in place to satisfy the
stated objectives. It typically is a reassessment of the
existing strategies and represents an update, or tuning of
that direction based on the experiences of the past year.
The finished document, published internally, is generally
brief in form and couched in terms of directions the company
is headed relative to specific business opportunities.
Following completion of the Strategy Document, the more
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structured planning activities begin, as directed by Boeing
corporate offices. The first step is the creation of what
is known as the "Key Elements Review". This is essentially
a presentation that concentrates on issues which require
Boeing corporate decision or agreement. Corporate decisions
relative to the Key Elements Review focus on a few items:
overall investment, net profit and capital outlay or
investment. The Key Elements Review will typically focus on
a relatively small number of issues and uses the previous
year's adjusted Long Range Business Plan and current
Operating Plan (see below) as a baseline for describing
where the division is and any new directions in strategy.
This presentation is made to senior corporate management
mid-summer each year, sometime after the operating
organizations have begun work on next years Long Range
Business Plan and Operating Plan. During this presentation,
senior management (typically the CEO), will share overall
company direction and describe how the operating company
should plan to fit this strategic direction.
The Long Range Business Plan (LRBP) is intended to
provide a ten year forecast of expected business levels and
a five year forecast of the resources required to execute
this business. Since the Strategy Document is only
distributed internally (that is within the operating
division, i.e. BCS) and the Key Elements Review is in
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presentation format, the LRBP is used to summarize topics
extracted from both of them. The LRBP also reflects any
strategic redirection provided by the corporate offices
during the Key Elements Review. It includes a mission
statement, division goals and objectives, business and
market environment characteristics, strategies, identifies
key competitors and key technologies, and finally quantifies
the resources required to carry out the business plan.
Current groundrules state that the first two years of the
LRBP, Key Elements and the Operating Plan have to reflect
the same numbers.
The Operating Plan, is the culmination of the planning
cycle. It defines company commitments and performance
measures as well as providing financial and resource
requirements data for the first two years of the LRBP.
Resource requirements (labor and non-labor) for the first
year are spread by month, and the second year spread by
quarter. The Operating Plan provides the detailed
information needed by the functional organizations and
corporate staff for the day-to-day administration of
resources. The plan provides the basis for BCS performance
evaluation. It is updated quarterly during the year to
reflect changes in commitments as they affect resources.
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APPENDIX B
MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE PLANNING AND EVALUATION PROGRAM
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of the Management Performance Planning and Evaluation Program
is to encourage clear communications about performance expectations,
performance progress and status and performance evaluation which will aid
management employees in developing and demonstrating competencies suppor-
tive of their continued career development.
B. PROGRAM CONCEPT
The program consists of four related segments:
1. Performance Planning
The Performance Planning and Evaluation process begins with perfor-
mance planning jointly conducted by the employee and supervisor. The
completed performance plan will reflect (1) those delegated perfor-
mance objectives which directly support accomplishment of the organi-
zation's current business objectives and (2) performance objectives
established by the employee and supervisor to sustain/improve overall
organization performance. The plan should be revised during the year
as necessary to reflect changing conditions.
2. Coachina
During the performance plan period, continuing attention should be
given by the employee and supervisor to the progress being demonstrated
toward achievement of performance plan objectives. Both the employee
and the supervisor have responsibility to identify potential/developing
performance problems and either may initiate discussion leading to
determination of the preventative/corrective actions which need to be
taken.
3. Performance Evaluation
At the completion of the performance plan period, the supervisor will
evaluate and discuss with the employee results achieved during the
period.
4. Career Develooment
As an aid to the employee in career development planning, the super-
visor will discuss with the employee observations of the performance
strengths demonstrated during the period and those areas of perfor-
mance in which the development of increased competence would contribu-
te to improved performance in current assignment and/or to longer-term
career growth.
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C. PROCEDURE
1. The normal performance plan period begins inediately following
establishment of the organization's annual business plan. To provide
for the communication of organization goals down through the manage-
ment organization, the performance planning process begins with those
managers reporting to the organization head and continues down through
all management levels. Performance plans for employees assigned/
reassigned in the organization during the performance plan period will
be prepared as a normal part of the orientation process.
At the beginning of the performance planning period, the supervisor
and employee should meet to discuss the employee's responsibilities
and to record the performance objectives the employee will be working
to achieve during the forthcoming period. During this meeting the
employee should be encouraged to participate fully in the performance
planning process.
The employee should be informed that at the end of the period, overall
performance will be evaluated. The evaluation will consider results
achieved in ongoing position responsibilities as well as achievement
of objectives set forth in the performance plan.
2. During the period, the employee and the supervisor should meet when-
ever appropriate to review progress, discuss ways to improve, and
agree on changes in direction, procedure or responsibility. The
employee should be encouraged to initiate these reviews whenever they
feel a need to discuss the job with the supervisor.
3. At the conclusion of the period covered by the the plan, the employee
should summarize achievements specifically related to objectives
contained in the performance plan. Conditions which may have altered
the plan or impacted achievement of objectives should be noted. The
intent here is for the employee to make a self-assessment of what has
been accomplished.
4. The employee should then meet with the supervisor for joint review of
achievements. The supervisor may concur in the employee's assessment,
or note additional information pertaining to accomplishment of objec-
tives. The supervisor should then complete entries evaluating the
degree to which achievements met the plan objectives.
5. Following review and evaluation of specific achievements, the super-
visor should then summarize the employee's overall performance using
the section provided on the Performance Planning and Evaluation Form.
Additionally, the supervisor should discuss with the employee obser-
vations of the significant performance strengths demonstrated by the
employee during the period and observations with respect to those
areas of performance in which development of increased competence
would contribute to improved performance in current assignment and/or
to longer-term career growth. Following such discussion, the super-
visor will record any useful conclusion.
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C. 6. At this point, it is the responsibility of the next level of manage-
ment to review the evaluation to assure consistency and equity.
Following this review, the manager and employee should meet to discuss
the performance evaluation and implications of the evaluation with
respect to the employee's career development. While career develop-
ment remains primarily an employee responsibility, the manager may
suggest for the employee's consideration, actions that might be taken
by the employee and/or the Company to aid the employee in achieving
his or her objectives.
An important consideration in career development is the employee's
willingness to consider internal job opportunities that require
relocation to a different geographic area. While it is recognized
that response to a relocation assignment depends on the specific job
opportunities and circumstances at that time, it is useful to under-
stand in advance whether or not the employee is amenable to relocation
consideration. The employee may so indicate in the space provided on
the form.
D. ROLE OF THE REVIEWING MANAGER
1. The reviewing manager is responsible for assisting subordinate managers
and for ensuring the overall quality of the Performance Planning and
Evaluation Program. This includes:
a. Guidance in the preparation of performance plans to ensure equity
and consistency.
b. Periodically reviewing the status of performance plans and
results; providing counsel, as appropriate, to subordinate
managers.
c. Previewing proposed performance evaluations to provide guidance
for equity, consistency and completeness. The reviewing manager
should also discuss appropriate coaching and counseling techniques
for the evaluation discussion.
d. Discussing the results of the evaluation and counseling interview;
providing assistance in resolving any open issues between the
administering manager and the employee, and signing the form.
E. USE OF FORMS
1. The Performance Planning and Evaluation Form (No. X-23229) is to be
used for preparing performance plans and evaluations. Supplemental
forms may be established, with the prior approval of the Director of
Industrial Relations, provided the essential content and use follows
the procedure and meets the basic objectives of the Performance
Planning and Evaluation Program.
2. Completed MPP&E forms will be retained for two years.
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MANAGEMENT PER FORMANCE PLANNING AND EVALUATION
LIMITED
Employe* Name (Last, First and Initial)
Employee Social Security No.
Position Title
Date Assigned Present Position
Data Assigned to This Appraiser
Date of Performance Plan
c
Daie of Periormance Evaluation
Organization Name
Budget No. Location
X-23229 REV 1l1s?
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PERFORMANCE PLAN OBJECTIVES
Statement of performance objectives employee can reasonably be expected to achieve during the coming period. List first any
obtective(s) which Ia critical to achievement of a current overall Division oblective and identify as Pnmary (P1. P2. etc.). Then list in
prority order objectives necessary to sustain/improve business operations. Changes In the plan may be recorded at any time dunng the
penod.
Employee s Signature Date
Supervisor s Name Supervisor's Signature Date
Management Review (Optional Comments)
Review-r s Name Reviewer's Sienature Date
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ACHIEVEMENTS
Summarize results achieved in each of the obsectives set forth In the Performance Plan. Record other EVALUATION
achievements/contributionls in space provided below.
e -.
2 =2
Other achievementsacontnbut ions (use additional page If necessary).
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PERFORMANCE REVIEW SUMMARY (USE ADDITIONAL PAGE. IF NECESSARY)
Supervisor's Evaluation of Overall Performance: Conaidering results achieved in ongoing position responsibilities as well as
Performance Plan achievements, summarte your evaluation of overall performance.
Superviore's ObservationstSuggestions: Oscuss with employee observed performance strengths and areas where improvement
might be advantageous to employee. Record any conclusions which may be useful.
Employs* Comments: The employee may record any comments pertaining to this review, Including desired developmental
opportunities:
Overall Performance Rating.
[ Exceeds normal job requirements in all areas.
Meets normal job requirements and exceeds requirements in many areas.
Meets normal job requirements.
r Does not meet normal }ob requirements.
Willing to consider relocation?
%sNoEmoloyee a Signature Date
Supervisor a Name Supervisor a Signature Date
Management Review (Optional Comments)
Reviewer I Name Reviewer a Segnature Date
